

VZCZCXYZ0028
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0129/01 0581324
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 271324Z FEB 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7590
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0679
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0602
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0533
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0897
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0659
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0506
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0747
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0517
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1109

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000129

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018
TAGS: [KNPP](#) [PARM](#) [IAEA](#) [IR](#)
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: EU-3 PREPARED TO SPONSOR A BOARD
RESOLUTION

REF: SECSTATE 18857

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b, d and h

Summary

1. (S) At a UK hosted-meeting on February 26, like-minded COMs (P3 1, Canada, Australia and Japan) agreed to pursue a Board of Governor's resolution on Iran assuming adoption of a UNSCR on Friday, February 29. The EU-3 agreed to prepare a draft. In order to mitigate any risk of interfering with the New York process, the like-minded also agreed not to engage Russia and China, or the EU, or table a Board resolution, until early after a UNSCR resolution is approved. A Board resolution would seek to reassert Board decisions on Iran, including suspension, to support the Secretariat's investigation of weaponization and to assert that outstanding issues are not resolved. France, Canada and other like-minded want to seize the momentum of the technical briefing (reftel). As Canada has argued, the March Board also presents a singular window of opportunity to demonstrate both UNSC and Board involvement. Timely passage of a UNSCR in New York will facilitate Board action. If a draft is tabled Monday, March 3, on the first day of the Board, consultations could to extend to the end of the week. End Summary.

New York First, Vienna Second

2. (S) Opening the like-minded meeting, UK Ambassador Simon Smith provided London's assessment of P5 1 Poldirs consultations the day before. He said that the UNSCR on Iran was on track for adoption February 29, despite the remaining Chinese hurdle on the joint ministerial statement. Given the dynamics in New York, Smith sensed reservations UKUN raised last week that a Board resolution not interfere with the New York process had been mitigated, though he had not spoken with UKUN this week and had found their concerns a bit overblown. He believed work on a Board resolution should continue among the lines the like-minded had discussed, but the timing of such a resolution was contingent on the UNSC process. Like-minded COMs agreed that the UNSC process had priority, but all were poised to move forward in the Board as soon as a UNSCR was adopted. The U.S., Canada and Australia encouraged the EU-3 to take the lead in sponsoring a Board

resolution. The EU-3 agreed to prepare a draft.

13. (S) The like-minded further agreed not to discuss a Board resolution beyond this core group until a UNSCR is adopted. Several Missions had heard that the Russians were not supportive when the issue of a Board resolution was raised on the margins of the P5 1 PolDir meeting. While the Chinese are focused on the P5 1 statement, the like-minded did not want to give them another pretext for delay in New York by raising the prospect of a resolution in Vienna. That said, most Board members are aware of the potential for a resolution on Iran, and the like-minded agreed to advise the Board Chair as soon as it was practicable, but likely not until early in the week of the Board.

More Reasons to Pursue a Board Resolution

14. (S) Ambassador Schulte advised that there were several good reasons to pursue a Board resolution. In addition to reasserting Board authority, a resolution would signal that the Iran issue has turned a new page in light of the DG report and the technical briefing on Iran. The like-minded agreed that a resolution would accomplish three goals: reinforce past Board decisions including suspension; support the Secretariat's investigation of weaponization issues and assert the Board's understanding that, contrary to Iran's claims, the work plan was not "over" and outstanding issues were not resolved, as the Secretariat had made clear. French Ambassador Deniau reported that Iran planned to send a letter to the UNSC President stating that the work plan was "over," thus putting the Secretariat in an awkward position. In his opinion, a Board resolution would help shield DDG Heinonen from NAM criticism. Ambassador Schulte agreed that the Board

should support Heinonen, who had put himself out on a limb by deciding on his own initiative to present the information in the technical briefing (reftel).

15. (S) Deniau also saw a Board resolution as means to "publicize" the Secretariat's findings on weaponization. He noted that the technical briefing was somewhat below the radar and did not have the same standing as a discussion in the Board. Although the room was packed at the briefing, a number of Board Ambassadors did not attend, and out-of-town Governors also did not have the opportunity to hear the briefing. He suggested that any Board member without a Permanent Mission in Vienna could ask the Secretariat to repeat the briefing in the Board room. Others recalled that the Secretariat had provided DPRK briefings during Board meetings in the past, but were not sure if they would agree to repeat this briefing.

16. (S) Canadian Ambassador Gervais-Vidricaire reiterated her argument that the March Board presented a singular window of opportunity for Board action. The momentum gained from the technical briefing further reinforced this view. She observed that the Secretariat had placed its credibility behind the weaponization information, which was based on multiple sources and its own investigations. French DCM Gross also advised that if the Board did not seize this moment when the Secretariat had so clearly laid out its concerns on weaponization, the technical briefing would be brushed aside. Canada strongly believed that the time for action to demonstrate that the UNSC and Board were actively involved was now. Ambassador Schulte further noted that the June Board may not be as propitious an opportunity for a Board resolution since the draft UNSCR requests the DG to report within 90 days, which would be just before the June Board, and thus work on a Board resolution then could interfere with another possible UNSCR.

17. (S) Australian Charge Kruse observed that there was a more positive dynamic in the Board now, with Iran pitted against the Secretariat. However, he cautioned that a resolution could risk a defensive reaction from the NAM. Australia agreed the Board should support the Secretariat's prerogative to undertake the investigation of weaponization. He noted

that UNSCR 1737 had asked the Secretariat to investigate outstanding issues and that previous DG reports had included the alleged studies. Iran had not opposed their inclusion until it was confronted with damning evidence, he added. UK Missionoff also noted that the 2005 Board resolution refers to weaponization issues.

8.(S) German Charge Kimmerling likewise supported a simple and straightforward resolution that stressed the authority of the Secretariat, which had been put into question by some, and needed to be clarified in a Board decision. He argued that a consensus (or near consensus) resolution pitting the Board against Iran would further isolate Iran. Kimmerling also suggested that the like-minded could float a consensus draft with Russia and China before Friday to lend support to the UNSC process.

¶9. (S) However, other like-minded Missions preferred to wait out the New York process before engaging Russia and China. Gervais-Vidricaire expressed some concern if there is no agreement in New York, UNSC deliberations could drag into next week. She trusted that Missions in New York were aware of the prospect of a Board resolution and that time was of the essence.

Timing and Tactics

¶10. (S) Smith advised that the EU-3 will take on the lead drafting role and sort out the content and timing of a resolution. He noted that a resolution had to strike a balance between being useful and attracting consensus and that certain elements, such as asserting Board authority, were non-negotiable. Smith acknowledged that it would be risky for the Board to be seen as reinterpreting the DG report, and Deniau believed it would be best to adhere as closely as possible to the report and technical briefing.

¶11. (S) Deniau observed that a resolution should aim at consensus, and that the current composition of the Board would help in this regard. Venezuela, which had called for a vote on two previous Board resolutions on Iran, was no longer on the Board, and the NAM would risk splitting their votes if a vote was called. Japan worried, however, that South Africa may call for a vote. Ambassador Schulte agreed that the resolution should aim for as broad a consensus as possible, but the like-minded must also be prepared to call for a vote. He advised that the text should build in some giveaways for negotiating purposes, though Canada noted that the time for negotiation would be short.

¶12. (S) The EU-3 will prepare a draft resolution. Pending UNSC action, the UK believed that Russia and China and EU members could be consulted early March 3, on the first day of the Board. The Board Chair would also be consulted early. Requests for instructions and consultations with various groups could take another three days, bringing us to action on the resolution by the end of the week.
SCHULTE